

**Seeing a New Enemy:
Battle Command in the Failed State**

**A Monograph
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
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
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ABSTRACT

SEEING A NEW ENEMY: BATTLE COMMAND IN THE FAILED STATE by MAJ
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The 1998 revision of the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) contains an important new mission for the armed forces of the United States. The failed state is identified as a new threat to the security interests of the United States. The increase in the number of failed states, the permissive intervention environment, and the NSS requirement to stabilize failed states, seem to guarantee the Army will continue to deal with this threat in the future. This monograph evaluated the effectiveness of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) tactical doctrine found in *Field Manual 7-98: Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict* for military operation within failed states.

The monograph utilizes the battle command process to visualize LIC tactical doctrine. FM 7-98 provides tactical level guidance to brigade and battalion commanders and staff officers in planning controlling and coordinating combined operations in a LIC environment. The visualizations are compared against the actual conditions found in failed states and the Army's recent experiences in Somalia and Haiti. The monograph uses the standards for effective doctrine contained in *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* as its evaluation criteria. The comparisons are analyzed to determine if the current LIC tactical doctrine is an effective tool for battle commanders to exercise battle command in a failed state.

The monograph determines that FM 7-98 does not create a shared approach on how to conduct operations and inadequately addresses the requirements for tactical commanders to adapt to the conditions of a failed state. It does, however, provide specific guidance on how to conduct operations in the form of appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures. The monograph recommends that future tactical doctrine should consider a general systems model for describing failed state environments.

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I INTRODUCTION

The 1998 revision of the United States National Security Strategy contains an important new mission for the armed forces of the United States. President Clinton identified the failed state as a new threat to the security interests of the United States. This modification to the National Security Strategy indicates interventions into troubled countries like Somalia and Haiti can no longer be interpreted as distractions to the Army's mission. Restoring stability to collapsing governments is now a mission the Army must prepared to execute.¹

Recognizing the dangers of failed states is part of the United States' strategic evolution after the cold war. Twenty years ago failed states were a minor concern to strategic planners. The United States only took notice of weak governments facing a communist threat. The United States' thoughts on stability operations previously centered around defeating a Maoist based insurgency which threatened a developing ally. Similarly, peace operations were thought to be synonymous with United Nations peacekeeping missions.² The end of the cold war allowed these previously subdued forms of conflict to reemerge. These are frequently based on intractable national, religious or ethnic differences, rooted in ancient disputes.

The United States may now face a strategic dilemma. The weakened and failing states in the developing world are causing regional instability, which in turn will pull the United States towards intervention. However, the recent identification of the threat of failed states and the specific focus of the cold war counterinsurgency doctrine suggests the Army may be unprepared to operate in this environment. The tactical doctrine rooted in cold war counter insurgency may not provide the tools for a tactical commander to successfully guide his forces in a failed state scenario.

The army's current tactical doctrine for operations in destabilized governments falls under the concept of Low Intensity Conflict, (LIC). LIC is an ambiguous concept. It is one of several terms in Army doctrine which describe military actions used in response to instability. The Department of Defense officially adopted LIC in 1986 to describe limited political-military struggles centered

on political, social, and economic objectives.³ It frequently involves long term conflict between competing political ideologies. LIC encompasses a broad range of military operations from humanitarian assistance to insurgency and counterinsurgency support.⁴

This monograph evaluates the suitability of LIC tactical doctrine for military operations within failed states. But before this question can be examined, it is important to first understand why failed states are a worthy of further consideration. A complete understanding of the importance and background of state disintegration is required in order to conduct a thorough and insightful evaluation.

The International Committee of the Red Cross was one of the first organizations to identify the threat failed states posed in the post cold war world. They noted few of the nearly fifty intrastate conflicts underway in the early 1990's resembled what they usually experienced during cold war conflicts. Intrastate conflict now involved insurrections against unpopular regimes, ethnic-minority uprisings against majority rule, and jackal gangs roaming freely in failed sates. Red Cross workers in Liberia reported the country was covered with masked thugs who took drugs, robbed civilians at gunpoint, and seemed to have no idea why or whom they were fighting.⁵

Government disintegration is one of the most disturbing elements in the post cold war world. The RAND Corporation reported to the United States Army that ethnic and separatist movements were a destabilizing threat to the United States security interests.⁶ The recent events in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda are all manifestations of the problems associated with failed states. In each case, intrastate conflict produced humanitarian and political crisis's which threatened regional stability.⁷

Former communist countries rushed to embrace more open and democratic forms of government after the Soviet Bloc dissolved. However, free elections and market economies cannot guarantee national success. Some of the countries which attempt to adopt democracy will fail during their

transition. These countries tend to relapse into authoritarian governments, or even worse, fracture into sub-national units controlled by tribal warlords or ethnic militias.⁸

Developing countries and the former Soviet Republics are failing in alarming numbers. The break up of the former Soviet Union discredited communist ideology in the international community. Many communist leaders discarded Marxist-Leninist ideology in favor of ethnic or tribal rhetoric to retain political power. However, their reckless, intolerant propaganda created dangerous divisions within their population. In some cases, their propaganda directly contributed to the outbreak of civil war.⁹

The rationale of state failure goes beyond ideology or economics. Many failed states share an artificial structure, borders which cut across tribal and ethnic lines creating population groupings without a common identity.¹⁰ Ethnic conflicts in post colonial Africa and post cold war Asia and Europe are most troublesome where the national architects drew territorial boundaries that enclosed competing groups within the boundaries of a an artificial state. The lack of a unifying national social structure means that any serious political, economic or ethnic conflict has the potential to fragment the existing central governments' control over the country.

Authoritarian governments are now in a worse position to survive in the next century. The end of the cold war represented a lost economic opportunity for many struggling countries. After the Second World War, any country, no matter how small or insignificant, could acquire tremendous amounts of economic, and military aid from one superpower in response to a threat or diplomatic overture from the other. Robert Kaplan observed, "Take away the Soviet threat and there is nothing (in Africa) with which to interest the West." Now, the police in Sierra Leone do not have enough gasoline to operate their vehicles. The government effectively surrenders control of the national capital to street gangs armed with AK-47's each evening as darkness falls. A member of the United States embassy in Sierra Leone describes her life as "...waking up each morning in a place on the verge of verge of anarchy."¹¹

A large number of artificial states are beginning to disintegrate into anarchy. A list of weak or failing states includes Haiti, Somalia, Lebanon, the Sudan, Liberia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Zaire, and the former Soviet Union.¹² A broader definition of failed states which included any nation which faced serious threats to their internal coherence or political order would add many more countries to the list of potential failed states. The Arroyo Center of the RAND corporation identified thirty different countries where there is a high potential for destabilizing ethnic conflict or state failure.¹³

The post cold war political structure creates a permissive environment for United States intervention into failed states. During the cold war, the United Nations faced serious obstacles implementing multilateral peace operations in areas where the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States collided. The cold war stalemate in the United Nations Security Council ended with the break up of the Soviet Union. Today, the United States is less likely to face a Security Council veto from a communist adversary when debating intervention into an intrastate conflict.¹⁴ The fall of the Berlin Wall not only created the conditions for many states to fail, but it also created an environment in which the United States, acting alone or in conjunction with the United Nations, could intervene with few constraints.

The events of the last ten years clearly demonstrate a trend towards United States intervention into the affairs of failed states. The US participated in just twelve United Nations sponsored peacekeeping missions between the Cold War years of 1947 to 1989. In the first ten years after the break up of the Soviet Union, the United States deployed in seventeen new peace keeping operations, while continuing support to four United Nations missions started before 1989.¹⁵ At least two of these new peacekeeping missions were in failed states.

The United States National Military Strategy, (NMS), supports the continued military intervention into failed states. The NMS lists ethnic, social, and environmental strains as threats to the strategic environment. Our strategic military objectives include specified missions to promote

peace and stability, shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of crises. The military has a clear mandate to "...respond to a variety of national needs other than war. The security environment we face includes threats to our country and to our interests that are not 'war' in the classic sense, and yet may call for military forces."¹⁶

Failed states are a legitimate threat to the United States' national security. Disintegrating states create humanitarian disaster areas. The refuse of a collapsed government includes refugee camps and sprawling shantytowns where new diseases, terrorist groups and international criminal organizations can breed. These transnational threats tend to spillover into other countries within the region and grow into serious regional security threats to the United States' interests. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, authors of *Future Shock* and *The Third Wave*, predicted, "There are going to be more cases like Somalia or Zaire where governments have broken down entirely and anarchy prevails. Other countries will intervene to protect themselves, to stem the drug trade, to prevent vast refugee flows from crossing a border, or to stop the spread of racial violence across their borders."¹⁷ All of these facts, the increase in the number of failed states, the permissive intervention environment, and the NMS requirement to stabilize failed states, seem to guarantee the Army will continue to deal with this threat in the future.

The United States Army should reexamine its doctrine for LIC operations to ensure it is an effective tool for exercising battle command in the failed state. Military doctrine is a reflection of the national military strategy, military capabilities and perceived threats to the United States' national interests.¹⁸ If the threats to our national security change, appropriate revisions to our tactical doctrine may also be required. Nations do not collapse over night. The international trend towards state anarchy is well under way. Dr. Steve Metz, a professor from the United States Army War College, called for a reassessment of LIC doctrine in 1995 in response to this trend. He noted if the Army acts quickly, it will shorten the period for learning and adaptation to the new threats of the post cold war world.¹⁹

The priority for doctrinal assessment should be the military's tactical doctrine. Small unit tactical leaders are the keys to success for any military operation, but it is particularly true in LIC. LTC Daniel P. Bolger, a former battalion commander in the 101st Air Assault Division, stated, "The nature of operations other than war, strategy, operations, and tactics have an unnerving tendency to neck down to about the level of lieutenant colonels, or colonels, commanders, and captains. Presidents and CINC's propose, but those in the dirt and above it dispose."²⁰

II Methodology

Military operations in Haiti and Somalia provide mixed signals on the effectiveness of the army's LIC doctrine. Operations conducted in Somalia during United Nations Military Operation in Somalia II, (UNOSOM II) are widely viewed as a failure, but similar operations conducted with the same tactical doctrine in Haiti, (Operation Uphold Democracy) are viewed as a success. There are several possible explanations for this disparity of results. The different environments and cultures is one obvious explanation. The sequential nature the operations occurred is a second.²¹ However, given the serious security threat that failed states represent to the national security interests of the United States, these explanations should not be accepted on face value. An objective study of LIC tactical doctrine is required to ensure tactical commanders have the proper doctrine for future operations in a failed state.

An adequate conceptual framework must be established in order to conduct an evaluation of LIC tactical doctrine. Normally, doctrine is extensively tested before it is disseminated to the army. Doctrine writers can examine new operational concepts in computer simulations or with test units using the new doctrine in the field. An academic evaluation is potentially less objective due to the lack of former control measures which are ingrained in most simulations and unit tests.

However, an academic evaluation can be objective if a satisfactory testing methodology is constructed. The best measure of doctrine is the results it produces. Doctrine should facilitate a units' ability to accomplish its mission in a cost-effective manner. A test of LIC doctrine in a failed state scenario would immediately demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of its concepts. The evaluation methodology must have objective evaluation standards, a conceptual model to generate tactical outcomes, and a model of a failed state to analyze the tactical outcomes. The model of a failed state should reflect the most likely conditions a military force will encounter. The Army's recent tactical experience in Haiti and Somalia can assist the development of the failed state model.

The first step towards establishing an evaluation methodology is the identification of evaluation criteria. Doctrine is one of the tools commanders use to accomplish his mission. Identifying doctrine's purpose can establish an utilitarian standard for doctrinal effectiveness. The utility of a tool is logically the best measure of its effectiveness. FM 100-5, *Operations*, defines three roles for doctrine in army operations. First, doctrine should establish a shared approach on how to conduct an operation. Second, it should be definitive enough to guide specific operations. And finally, doctrine must be adaptable to address diverse and varied situations worldwide.²² These three standards establish the utilitarian criteria for evaluating tactical doctrine. However they require some refinement in order to clearly understand their utility; for example, what does the requirement that doctrine 'create a shared approach on how to conduct an operation' really mean to tactical commander?

Doctrine creates a common approach to execute operations through establishing a mental model of the problem. The former Commanding General of the Training and Doctrine Command, (TRADOC), General Frederick Franks, stated "Our doctrine is not dogma, nor is it prescriptive. Instead, it is a descriptive document that provides a framework of how to think about operations".²³ Peter M. Senge, Director of Massachusetts Institute for Technology's Center for Organizational Learning, identified mental models as the key to creating a shared approach to problem solving

within large organizations. Senge defines mental models as the deeply ingrained assumptions or generalizations that influences the understanding of the environment or nature of the problem.²⁴

Doctrine supplies the military with mental models on how to conduct operations.

The other roles for doctrine identified in FM 100-5 are more straightforward. The standard that doctrine should be 'adaptable to diverse situations', is self-explanatory. The criteria that doctrine should be, 'specific enough to guide operations', is normally manifested in tactics, techniques and procedures, (TTP's). TTP's are published in field manuals to provide illustrative examples on how to plan and execute specific types of operations. For example, in FM 71-3: *The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade*, TTP's are listed for conducting a forward passage of lines. The FM identifies the tactical principles involved when passing friendly units, outlines the possible planning considerations, and provides a graphic depiction of a brigade executing the operation.

FM 100-5 provides definitive standards for measuring the utility of doctrine. The next step towards establishing an evaluation methodology is to identify a conceptual model to generate tactical outcomes. It must be able to duplicate doctrine's influence on tactical operations. Battle command doctrine is the best tool for generating these outcomes. The unique background of battle command doctrine justifies its use in the evaluation methodology.

Battle command doctrine describes the process commanders use to plan and execute tactical operations. It describes the art of battle decision making, leading, and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions.²⁵ Battle command was first identified as a separate battlefield function in the 1993 version of FM 100-5. The intent of battle command and its associated doctrine was to conceptually separate the commander's means of implementing control of his forces from the cognitive process he uses to guide operations. Successful commanders can see a battle unfold in their minds, see how the enemy will employ this forces given the existing conditions, and to see how to employ their forces to defeat the enemy.²⁶

The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, (TRADOC) created battle command doctrine after an extensive review of the requirements for battlefield leadership and decision making. Battle command was developed under the direction of General Frederick Franks during his tenure as TRADOC Commander. He felt the previous doctrine of 'command and control' was a worn out antiquated vestige from the cold war.

Battle command doctrine was created to provide army leaders with the tools necessary to deal with a wider range of military operations. It was created to specifically deal with unique situations like the failed state. The goal was to create a process that could serve a commander conducting high intensity combat in central Europe or a unit deployed to the third world executing operations other than war. General Franks recognized the United States' strategic position significantly changed after the cold war. The demise of the Soviet Union meant the Army of the future would most likely deploy as a contingency force into new environments where our cold war planning factors and battle drills would have little utility. He wanted to ensure that future commanders could, "...read new battlefields, put together new tactical teams and read new (ambiguous) enemies."²⁷

Battle command is the ideal conceptual tool to determine the effectiveness of LIC doctrine. However, to use it effectively, doctrine's influence on the battle command process must be clearly understood. Battle command has two vital components - decision making and leadership.²⁸ Doctrine is used primarily within the decision making component during battlefield visualization.²⁹ The artistic nature of military science implies intuition plays a significant role in tactical decision making. In reality, doctrinal knowledge forms a large part of a leaders tactical competency.³⁰ Commanders combine doctrinal methodologies with their own personal intuition to make tactical decisions.³¹ In this manner, military doctrine compliments a commander's intuitive abilities. It provides a foundation for decision making where the commander's personal experience is limited.

Visualization is the key to effective battle command. Battlefield visualization describes the process a commander uses to develop a clear understanding of his current state with relation to the enemy and environment, envisions a desired end state, and then visualizes the sequence of activities that will move his force from its current state to the end state. LTG John E. Miller, the Deputy Director of TRADOC, wrote in 1995, "A clear and concise mental image of the commander's entire battlespace is critical to effective mission accomplishment because it drives the entire planning and execution process."³² Doctrine is one of the fundamental building blocks of visualization. If doctrine contains the components listed in FM 100-5, accurate mental models and effective TTP's, it can assist a commanders' visualization of effective courses of action.

Doctrine's influence in battlefield visualization is easy to underestimate. In future LIC environments, doctrine will have a greater role in visualizing the battlefield. The current officer development system cuts years of tactical experience from future brigade commanders' experience, as compared to the officers who served in the cold war army. General Franks believes that a solid understanding of doctrine is a basic competency of all successful battle commanders.³³

This discussion of battle command doctrine establishes battlefield visualization as an appropriate conceptual model to generate doctrine's effect on tactical operations. The next logical requirement is to identify which specific aspects of the battlefield require visualization. LIC battlefields are difficult to visualize. LIC scenarios might include armed and hostile opponents, passive but not necessarily neutral populations, and even more ambiguous threats such as contaminated water or chaos from a drought or flood, all operating in the same battlespace.³⁴

FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, specifies which aspects of the battlefield tactical planners should visualize during mission planning. As the primary planning guide for brigade and battalion staffs, it is the proper reference for questions concerning the planning of tactical operations. FM 101-5 recommends units identify: the environmental characteristics that will influence enemy and friendly operations, the environmental aspects which forces must contend for

control of; and possible threat organizations, operations, and courses of action.³⁵ A proper understanding of these elements is essential for effective battle command.

This discussion of visualization completes the development of a utilitarian model for evaluating LIC doctrine. FM 100-5 identified the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of doctrine. Battle command visualization is the conceptual tool for generating the effects of doctrine on tactical operations. Finally, FM 101-5 established which aspects of the battlefield environment are required for effective battlefield visualization.

The last requirement to develop an evaluation methodology to create an accurate model of a failed state to test the visualizations LIC doctrine. An acceptable model begins with a clear definition of a failed state. A state is a sovereign government over a geographically bounded territory. It includes the terrain, social institutions and population within its territory. The physical manifestations of the state are the apparatuses of the government to include the armed forces, the regulatory and police agencies.³⁶

It is difficult to establish a universal model of a failed state. A failing nation is as unique as the people, culture and geography of the area affected. Robert B. Aspery, the author of *War in the Shadows*, a comprehensive history of guerrilla warfare observed, "one small war rarely resembles another: each generally produced specific challenges that had to be met with specific and sometimes highly unorthodox tactical modifications."³⁷ Although his comment was concerned with the general nature of guerilla warfare, it accurately reflects the problems associated with defining intra-state within the failed state.

Defining the conditions of any future operation is obviously a matter of great speculation. However, as with any general problem, it is possible to draw some basic observations on the whole, if the individual cases are studied in detail to learn what is important when operating in the environment. A model constructed in this manner cannot replicate a future deployment with

absolute certainty, but it will have a high probability of representing many of the characteristics a tactical leader may encounter.

In a 1996 article of *Parameters*, Baker and Ausink developed specific indicators of a failed state. State failure was described as the governments' loss of the instruments of state power, the armed forces, domestic police force, civil service, and system of law and justice. These instruments are the states' source of legitimacy, cohesion and control over its territory and population. The state fails when these instruments cease to exist or can no longer exercise their control. Haiti and Somalia fit this general model of state failure. In both instances, the central government's institutions of power ceased to exist or had deteriorated to the point where they were no longer effective.³⁸

State collapse is a gradual process, which begins when national resources are exhausted or are stretched beyond their limits. No one single factor is the responsible for the loss of national resources. Drought, the international economy, and a long-term internal civil war combined to undermine the state control of Somalia. A punitive economic embargo against the military junta in power in Haiti and the traditionally weak economy combined with a myriad of other political and social forces to destroy the state of Haiti. Sub-state actors, such as criminal organizations, ethnic groups, or warlords grow in the power vacuum of the disintegrating state. If the state degeneration becomes too widespread, society is not able to rebound into a viable political or economic structure and anarchy prevails.³⁹

In Haiti, the central government deteriorated but it did not totally fail. The judicial system ceased functioning on 30 September 1991, after the coup d'etat ousted President Aristide. The governments' civil services, which include hospitals and public utilities, began to suffer. Electricity and drinking water were produced only in the capital city of Port-au-Prince, and there only intermittently. The domestic security forces were operating with limited effectiveness. The Haitian Army or *Forces Armées d'Haïti*, (FAd'H) had participated in three coups in the decade prior to

United States intervention. Intelligence reports indicated the FAd'H was cooperating with drug traffickers to move narcotics out of South America through Haiti to the east coast of the United States.⁴⁰

On the other hand, Somalia was a complete state failure. All of the national instruments of control ceased functioning when the government went into exile. The political factions of the Somalia civil war fractured into over fifteen warlord lead tribal groups. Violence and looting became so wide spread that international relief agencies could not provide emergency humanitarian assistance. Warlords targeted relief agencies to block food shipments to rival tribes and clans. Somalia became a vast wasteland in a state of complete anarchy filled with hundreds of thousands of starving people.⁴¹

A clear definition of state failure is only part of an adequate failed state model. The environmental characteristics of a failed state must also be identified. Several advisory organizations to the Department of Defense have produced strategic studies to increase the United States' knowledge of failed states. The Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College, the Brooking Institute, and the RAND Corporation have published studies on the national security implications of failed states. Although these studies approached the problem from a strategic perspective, they also define the dynamics of a failed state. Review of these studies identifies the general characteristics inherent in collapsed states.

The general characteristics of a failed state include: economic collapse, the formation of ethnic and religious factions, the presence of criminal organizations, the proliferation of weapons, large urban areas, humanitarian crisis's and human rights abuses. These characteristics must be examined in detail in order to understand the failed states.

Economic failure is a common characteristic of state failure. The collapse of Somalia closely corresponded to disintegration of its economy. The Somalia government crumbled as the price and market share of state principle export, livestock, fell in the international markets. This economic

crisis caused inflation over 800%, a huge foreign debt, and a loss of revenues for the central government.⁴² Similar conditions existed inside Haiti before the United Nations intervention.

Haitian has one of the weakest economies in the Western Hemisphere. The living conditions of the indigenous population are deplorable. The United States economic embargo against the repressive military government failed to force the military junta from office. Instead, it destroyed the domestic economy. The Haitian national infrastructure collapsed creating shortages of fuel, medicine, electricity and drinking water. The Haitian population suffered from extensive malnutrition despite the diligent efforts of relief organizations to administer to their needs.⁴³

Another characteristic element of failed states is the presence of organized crime. *The Journal of Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* established the relationship between the loss of state control within its borders and an increase in criminal activities in the political vacuum. There are established links between Somalia warlords and drug trade, Basque separatist and extortion rings and arms trafficking and ethnic criminal groups in many of the decaying regions of the former Soviet Union. In Haiti, there was credible evidence that the military and police were involved in narco trafficking with Colombian drug rings.⁴⁴

States cannot exercise their authority over their territory only if they do not have the power to defeat armed challenge within their borders. When a state fails, the armed gangs, drug runners and organized crime can potentially defeat the government's faltering security forces. These sub-state actors reinforce the conditions undermining the states' control and authority causing a downward spiral in state control.⁴⁵

Ethnic and religious conflicts are common in failed states. Samuel P. Huntington believes cultural identities are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post- Cold War world.⁴⁶ Ethnic conflicts prevalent in the disintegrating state can be a contributing cause of instability or a byproduct of it. In some cases, a sub-state actor, such as a criminal organization or a political faction, may use ethnic propaganda to increase their struggle over an area or specific

segment of the population. In other cases, the population simply returns to their basic cultural or religious identities in response to the loss of their national identity.⁴⁷

Religious conflict is potentially the most divisive and destructive force inside a failed state. Radical Moslem religious sects destroyed Afghanistan after Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. Islam ceased to be a unifying factor between the different tribes against a common enemy. Instead, the tribes fought between themselves over which form of Islam would control the post war government. The violence of the ensuing civil war surpassed anything seen in the previous ten years of insurgency against the Soviet Union. Militias brutally targeted and destroyed displaced persons, hospitals, mosques and schools. In the end, the Kabul government ceased to exist and all state services failed. The rebel factions left in control of Kabul did not have the means or the inclination to administer to the cities' population.⁴⁸

It is likely that future operations in failed states will require United States forces to operate in urban terrain. The global demographic trend of urbanization is just as prevalent in failing states as the industrialized nations. As government resources dwindle and the economy collapses the rural population tends to migrate to the cities where the essential civil and economic activities are still functioning. The influx of rural transplants to urban areas tends to exacerbate the central government's lack of resources. Rural migrants are unlikely to find employment and become refugees in large urban slums or shantytowns which tend to grow on the fringe of large cities. There are no services or sanitation in these slums. Crime and diseases become major problems.⁴⁹ In both Haiti and Somalia, major military operations were conducted in the cities of Mogadishu and Port-au-Prince.

Commanders can expect to face a proliferation of weapons. Disintegrating states are flooded with military hardware, mostly old Kalashnikov rifles, which are bought and sold openly in local markets for as little as the price of a loaf of bread. The availability of weapons is a consequence of state failure. In some cases, the government's arsenal is plundered when the state loses control

over its own institutions. In other cases, the weapons are imported during civil wars, through criminal organizations or to arm ethnic militias. Modern small arms are lightweight and simple to operate. The Red Cross believes there are several hundred thousand child soldiers carrying automatic weapons and rocket launchers in the armed conflicts in the developing world.⁵⁰

Humanitarian disasters and wide spread human rights abuses also characterize failed states. The indigenous civilian population living without economic support and civil government will experience wide spread suffering and diseases. The Somalia suffered 350,000 deaths from famine, malnutrition and diseases before the United Nations intervened.⁵¹ There were fewer deaths in Haiti. International relief agencies struggled to provide minimal services in place of the national government. Despite their efforts, diseases and malnutrition were wide spread. It was estimated that one half of a million Haitians suffered from tuberculosis and one million people were infected with the HIV virus.⁵² The brutal military junta controlling Haiti caused thousands of Haitians to attempt to flee from Haiti in flotillas of leaky boats. The United States was forced to act to prevent thousands of Haitian refugees from dying at sea or landing on Florida's coast.⁵³

This discussion of the environment of a failed state completes the monographs' evaluation methodology. The monograph can now continue into the visualization process using the threat characterizations found in LIC doctrine. The battlefield elements visualized from doctrine are doctrine's primary influence on the battle command process.

III VISUALIZATIONS

This monograph visualizes the LIC tactical doctrine contained in FM 7-98, *Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict*. FM 7-98 provides tactical level guidance to brigade and battalion commanders

and staff officers in planning, controlling and coordinating combined arms operations in a low intensity conflict environment.⁵⁴ It has been used as a reference in developing a wide range of related field manuals including FM 71-100-2, *Infantry Division Operations: Tactics Techniques and Procedures* and FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*.

FM 7-98 identifies four different categories of LIC military operations: counterinsurgency operations, peacekeeping operations, combating terrorism, and peacetime contingency operations. Peacetime contingency operations include three subordinate missions, which are counter-narcotic, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations. The monographs' visualization of mental models focuses within FM 7-98 on chapter two, chapter three and section four of chapter six. Chapter two describes counterinsurgency operations, (COIN). Chapter three describes terrorist tactics, techniques and strategies. Section four of chapter six addresses the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, (IPB) of LIC environments.⁵⁵ The analysis of LIC operations TTP's and the adaptability of doctrine will use all of the chapters and annexes of FM 7-98.

The evaluation methodology is based, in part, on the understanding that military doctrine represents a hypothesis on how to conduct operations. Doctrine recommends, in general terms, what type of military force to employ and what tasks it should be assigned for a given situation. Doctrine, if viewed as a hypothesis, can be tested by logically deducing empirical statements from its concepts.⁵⁶ These statements are compared to the reality of the tactical situation to determine if they are accurate. If an empirical statement is determined to be true, the doctrine is effective. The more times a doctrine's outcomes are verified, the more effective it becomes for a commander.

The first major area visualized is the first criteria for measuring the effectiveness of doctrine, the mental model of the operation. FM 7-98 creates a very clear mental model for LIC operations. LIC is a political and economic struggle between competing ideologies for legitimacy, authority and support of the domestic population. According to FM 7-98, insurgent forces are organized along political lines.⁵⁷ They fight to reduce government control and gain popular support for the

insurgency movement. Their ultimate goal is to replace the current government with a revolutionary government.⁵⁸ A number of empirical statements are deduced from this general mental model.

FM 7-98 proposes there is a direct relationship between government services and support for the government. This concept is developed through out the field manual. In chapter two, it states that threat forces will attack small government out posts to decrease the government's control over its territory. Their tactical objective is to block government resources from reaching the civilian population in order to reduce popular support to the government. Chapter six identifies the country's infrastructure as a potential target for insurgent forces. Enemy forces target bridges, power stations, electrical lines and other national resources to demonstrate their ability to challenge the government and emphasize the government's inability to meet the needs of the population.⁵⁹

FM 7-98 also establishes a direct relationship between the amount of popular support a threat force receives and its military capability. The more support an insurgent force has, the closer their military operations come to resembling conventional combat. Chapter two includes a model of a Maoist insurgency to describe the general evolution of a threat movement. Irregular forces use terrorist tactics during their infancy, then grow in size and strength to execute a guerilla war and finally progresses to conventional military operations supported with guerilla forces as the movement gains popular strength.⁶⁰

The visualization process also established a direct relationship between the strength of the insurgent movement and the tactics it uses. As the insurgence increases in strength and organization, it will conduct larger and more conventional combat operations. Following the Maoist insurgency model, conflict will progress from a position of weakness, where insurgents are limited to terrorist attacks, to a guerilla war where hit and run tactics are used. Finally, the conflict reaches a war of movement where guerilla and conventional combat forces attack and defend key terrain.⁶¹

Finally, FM 7-98 describes a direct relationship between the level of government control and the amount of threat activity. Chapter two states the amount of government control in an area directly affects the ability of the insurgent to conduct operations. If friendly operations force the guerilla out of his base camps, he sets camps in rugged, unfriendly areas that are not easily penetrated by government forces. The implication of these concepts is that guerillas will avoid those areas where government forces are operating in strength.⁶²

FM 101-5 recommends units specifically visualize: the environmental characteristics that will influence enemy and friendly operations, the environmental aspects which forces must contend for control of, and possible threat organizations, operations, and courses of action during planning. Visualization of these battlefield elements should support the basic mental model for an operation to develop a common approach to an operation.

The visualization of LIC doctrine suggests friendly forces will operate in a favorable environment. The differences in geography, terrain, and culture will initially inhibit friendly operations. However, United States forces can employ sophisticated intelligence gathering systems and extensive logistical support to the theater. This will create an intelligence and firepower advantage over the insurgent forces over the long term.⁶³

In contrast, enemy forces will operate in a hostile environment. The host nation government and United States military forces will actively campaign against insurgent threats. Insurgencies must establish covert networks of support to avoid detection. The insurgent forces must establish lines of support and communication with rebel held sanctuaries or external groups willing to provide military support.⁶⁴ Insurgents have limited support and will experience difficulty in personnel recruitment. Resupply of material can limit their operations.⁶⁵

Visualizations propose the support of the civilian population is the one critical area of contention in LIC operations. The importance of public support is clearly established in chapter six. It states the main focus of LIC operations is the control and support of the civilian population.

FM 7-98 specifically describes the population as being the "key terrain".⁶⁶ The success of friendly military operations will depend on the ability of friendly forces to affect the civilian population. Chapter two states the COIN forces must identify insurgent elements and remove them from the civilian populace to reestablish control over the country.⁶⁷ Threat forces must also compete to gain popular support if they are to achieve their final goal of replacing the government.

FM 7-98 presents a very clear visualization of the enemy organization, operations, and courses of action. According to FM 7-98, insurgent forces will organize along political lines. Insurgent membership and organizations are based solely on accepting the revolutionary ideology, regardless of ethnic, religious or tribal background. Internal divisions may occur within the revolution based on political differences. The enemy can establish networks with external international organizations for arms, money, intelligence and other types of support.⁶⁸

There is a clear organization and hierarchy within the threat's political and military structure. Forces are organized into cells, squads, sections and platoons. Units may perform specialized roles such as providing logistic support to combat forces or intelligence gathering. Most insurgent forces are smaller than a company sized force. However, the leadership is capable of massing units to conduct company and battalion sized operations using conventional tactics.⁶⁹

The tactics of insurgent forces are a critical component of visualization. Enemy actions are based on small scale, hit and run tactics. The insurgent can employ a broad range of tactical options ranging from acts of terrorism to conventional combat. These tactical options will fall within a predictable range of courses of actions based on the strength of the insurgent within the population.

The second major criteria for visualization are the TTP's recommended in doctrine. FM 7-98 does provide specific TTP's for units to consider. Chapter two provides examples of common TTP's used during movement security, border control, and urban operations. Appendix C, Operations and Techniques, to FM 7-98 presents a compilation of techniques used to conduct most

common types of LIC tactical operations. These are listed in a matrix in figure 1. The matrix effectively cross-references specific tactical operations with the forces requirements, intelligence reliability and other specific mission parameters, (see figure 1).⁷⁰

OPERATION	SIZE	INSURGENCY PHASE	MODE	PURPOSE	TARGET
ROADBLOCKS	≥ PLT	I, II, III	OFF/DEF	POPULATION & RESERVE CONTROL	INDIVIDUAL CONTROL
CHECK POINTS	≥ PLT	I, II, III	OFF/DEF	POPULATION & RESERVE CONTROL	INDIVIDUAL CONTROL
CORDON AND SEARCH	≥ CO	II, III	DEF	POPULATION & RESERVE CONTROL	AREAS
RAID	≥ PLT	II, III	OFF	SECURE INFO, DESTROY ENEMY, LIBERATE PERSONNEL	SPECIFIC TARGETS
PATROLLING	≥ PLT	I, II, III	OFF/DEF	POPULATION & RESERVE CONTROL	AREAS
AMBUSH	≥ CO	I, II, III	OFF/DEF	POPULATION & RESERVE CONTROL	INTERDICT MOVEMENT
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT	BN	III	OFF	POPULATION & RESERVE CONTROL	ENEMY UNITS
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE	≥ BN	III	OFF	POPULATION & RESERVE CONTROL	ENEMY LOCATIONS
HASTY ATTACK	CO	II, III	OFF/DEF	DESTROY ENEMY	ENEMY UNITS
DELIBERATE ATTACK	CO	II, III	OFF	DESTROY ENEMY	ENEMY UNITS
EXPLOITATION	BN	III	OFF	POPULATION & RESERVE CONTROL	ENEMY UNITS
PURSUIT	BN	III	OFF	DESTROY WITHDRAWING FORCES	ENEMY UNITS
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT BASE	BN	II, III	DEF	SUPT OPS LIMITED LOG BASE	ESTABLISH PRESENCE
PATROL BASES	≥ BN	II, III	DEF	CMD & CNTRL RECON SITES	LIMITED TO DEFENSE
IMMEDIATE ACTION DRILLS	≥ BN	I, II, III	OFF/DEF	DESTRUCTION DEFENSE	ENEMY UNITS
ENCIRCLEMENT	≥ BN	II, III	OFF	DESTRUCTION	LARGE UNITS BASE COMPLEX

(figure-1)

The final criterion for visualization is the doctrine's adaptability to diverse situations. LIC forces must adapt to new battlefield conditions. It includes specific recommendations on several different environments to include urban, jungle and mountainous terrain.⁷¹ Although the enemy actions are predictable, however, United States forces will most likely not have a doctrinal template of threat activities at the beginning of the mission. Threat tactics will appear to be unconventional to friendly military forces. As a result, FM 7-98 recommends the development of situational templates through pattern analysis of intelligence reports to replace any doctrinal templates.

The visualization of FM 7-98 will potentially influence a commander to adopt a specific course of action. FM 7-98 generally recommends a tactical commander should consider an offensive campaign to separate the insurgent forces from the civilian population. The inherent intelligence and fire power advantages of friendly forces will allow units to identify and destroy the critical support structure of the insurgency which would include, arms caches, the insurgent chain of command and the insurgent forces. As a supporting effort to this campaign, a tactical commander will protect national infrastructure from insurgent attack.

IV Analysis

Tactical commanders attempting to use FM 7-98 to visualize military operations in a failed state will have to make some assumptions to adapt the doctrine from FM 7-98 to the failed states environment. Traditional COIN operations are focused on United States' military support to a friendly government fighting an internal revolutionary movement. Tactical commanders operating in a failed state will face either no government or a severely weakened central government which is struggling to maintain physical control over its territory, rather than its ideological control over its population. Military forces, however, will support a political body, either a restored national government or a multinational organization, which is directing the military intervention. The necessity to conceptually modify LIC doctrine is not a decisive flaw.

The true test of LIC doctrine's utility is its ability to assist a commander's visualization of a failed state environment. Battle command doctrine's visualization process produced a mental model, adaptation requirements, and specific TTP's for failed state operations. Analysis of LIC tactical doctrine will focus on the comparison of these visualizations with the common characteristics of a failed state using the evaluation criteria established in FM 100-5.

The first area of comparison is the mental model of the operation. The visualization of FM 7-98 creates a mental model of an ideological struggle between militant revolutionary forces and a resisting government. The doctrinal model centers on the direct relationship between the government and the insurgent threat that created the competition for control of territory and public support. The empirical deductions based on this model for the nature of the environment, and the capabilities of threat and friendly forces do not coincide with the model of a failed state.

There is not a consistent, direct relationship between the availability of essential services and the strength of the insurgent threat. In Somalia, the heaviest fighting occurred after the multinational military forces restored essential services. During the United Task Forces, (UNITAF) operations in Somalia, military forces were tasked to deploy and secure the international relief operations to restore essential services to the people of Somalia. UNITAF casualties totaled twenty-four wounded and eight killed in action during its nine-month mission. However, UNOSOM II, the United Nations mission to create a political settlement to the failed state, multinational forces, experienced ninety-eight soldiers killed and over four hundred wounded. UNOSOM II experienced this heavy fighting despite the fact that famine conditions were ended and essential services were restored in the country. The existing mental model cannot reconcile how the insurgent threat grew despite the improved conditions in the local population.⁷²

There is a similar problem with the empirical deduction of the direct relationship between a threat group's popular support and its military capability. The Haitian FAd'H do not fit any portion of the Maoist model. The FAd'H never enjoyed popular support of the people.⁷³ The FAd'H's source of support was the Haitian military junta. Organized criminal organizations are another example of power, which is not dependent on public support. Small isolated ethnic and subversive movements have successfully used the profits from crime to support their operations in failed states.⁷⁴

The direct relationship between threat strength and threat tactics is also untrue. The actions of Somali warlords do not match the Maoist model. Somali forces did not engage in terrorist tactics against the overwhelming combat power of UNITAF forces. Instead, they openly cooperated with the intervention.⁷⁵ When the clans won overwhelming popular support after the 3 October 1993 clash with United States troops, the lead clan chief, Muhammed Farah Aidid, did not progress into conventional combat operations. Instead, he declared a cease-fire. For the remainder of UNOSOM II's mission, Somalia clans restricted their activities to uncoordinated banditry until the UN forces withdrew.⁷⁶

The deduction that there is a direct relationship between government control and insurgent activity is sustained. The increase in insurgent activity in Somalia corresponds to the decrease in the United Nations ratio of combat troops to logistics troops.⁷⁷ United States operations in Haiti also support this conclusion. COL James M. Dubik, who commanded the 2nd Brigade of JTF 190 in Operation Uphold Democracy, thought, "...the number one reason for success, and I think this is a common approach that both the Marines and I took, is that whenever we do something we do it in an overwhelming and intimidating way."

The environment does not effect enemy in the manner visualized in FM 7-98. Sub-state actors have few problems finding military weapons and supplies in the failed state environment. The entire country of Somalia was heavily armed as a result of the long- term civil war which introduced large numbers of weapons into the society. Military forces may not be able to interdict insurgent weapons storage areas if they are distributed throughout the population. The more significant shortcoming of the visualization, however, is that it does not consider the fact that the environment itself, the ecological system, may be a component of the threat. The Somalia drought, soil erosion, and international livestock market were environmental threats causing the instability in Somalia.⁷⁸

The organization of sub-state actors does not follow the visualizations produced from FM 7-98. Threat forces are nonhierarchical, decentralized and bare little resemblance to the enemy visualized from FM 7-98. Factions are organized along several possible lines to include religious, economic, ethnic, tribal, or clan lines. One of the important differences in this type of organization is the fact that it is non-hierarchical. Members of a group are bound to a central authority to different degrees. Factions are not paramilitary forces hidden in the civilian population, nor do they cooperate with conventional forces to achieve an over arching political agenda. In many cases, they are simply a primitive people who will resort to sporadic violence to respond to perceived external threats. These sub-state actors will organize into loose coalitions based on their unique self-interests.⁷⁹

The elements of the environment that will effect friendly forces' military operations are the next area of comparison. FM 7-98 indicated that the United States military forces would operate in a favorable environment. The failed state model suggests the environment is hostile to friendly forces.

The visualized intelligence advantage is difficult to achieve. The rapidly changing environment of a failed state works against the ability of friendly forces to plan and execute military operations. Strategic intelligence assets did not detect that the Somalia port infrastructure, like the rest of the country, had fallen apart. The principle harbor was filled with inoperative ships tied to the docks. Only one of the harbor's cranes was still operable. These undetected problems significantly altered the army's deployment time line. Logistics planners had estimated it would require thirty-six days to move 1.2 million square feet of military cargo to Somalia. In reality it took sixty-six days to complete the deployment.⁸⁰ These delays significantly altered the deploying forces' initial capabilities and plans. Likewise, in Haiti, the CJTF 190 J-2 reported analysis of national intelligence assets produced a number of errors on the conditions within Haiti. The J-2 misread everything from trafficability of road surfaces to state of repair of Haitian military equipment.⁸¹

The United States will initially know little about failed state threats, much less what their center of gravity may be. Many of these potential failed states were on the periphery of the United States cold war collective security arrangements. As a result, we will know little about the tribes, customs and culture of the environment. In some cases, military linguists will not even be able to speak the local languages. Maps, communications links and even satellite coverage may be poor. Worse yet, as the state slowly fails, what information is available will tend to be outdated as ports and airfields fall apart through neglect. These information shortfalls will tend to compound logistics problems and estimates.⁸²

The anticipated advantage in firepower and intelligence did not materialize in Somali. Initially, shortages of American drafted maps of Somalia resulted in ground forces operating with Soviet 1:100,000 scale maps. The difficult conversion of Soviet map grids to the American 1:250,000 aviation maps made it impossible to generate calls for fire or close air support in the opening stages of the operation.⁸³ The fact that most military operations occurred in urban areas also mitigated the United States advantage in firepower. The risk of significant collateral damage prevented the employment of close air support in the Battle of Mogadishu.⁸⁴

The second evaluation criterion is a comparison of TTP's. The TTP's recommended in FM 7-98 accurately corresponds to the TTP's units perform in LIC operations in failed states. Major General Arnold, the Army Forces Commander for Operation Restore Hope, noted the operations performed at battalion level and below closely matched the doctrinal tasks units routinely train for to prepare for conventional combat.⁸⁵ COL James M. Dubik identified nine critical tactical tasks to perform stability operations in Haiti. All of the tasks COL Dubik recognized are listed in Appendix C to FM 7-98. Two of the remaining three brigade commanders assigned to CJTF 190 concurred that the TTP's used at the battalion level and below were satisfied within existing unit TTP's.⁸⁶

The final area of comparison is the evaluation criteria of adaptability to diverse situations. FM 7-98 highlights adaptability as a doctrinal imperative for LIC operations. Chapter one notes United States forces are required to change or modify tactical methods and organizations to accommodate different tactical situations. The concept of adaptability is reinforced in the subsequent chapters as well. However, there is a subtle difference between the adaptability requirements envisioned from FM 7-98 and the reality of the failed state. LIC doctrine focuses on one components of adaptability, the requirement for friendly forces to adjust to the unique tactical environment. It fails to recognize the environmental forces' ability to adapt to American actions.

Focusing on the adaptation of friendly forces can produce dangerous results. During the Battle of Mogadishu, on 3 October, 1993, eighteen American soldiers were killed in a pitched street battle during a raid to capture clan leaders. Somali warlords observed six American air assault operations conducted the previous month and noted the predictability of the American tactics. One of the faction leaders observed, "If you use a tactic twice, you should not use it a third time."⁸⁷ When the tactics were repeated again in October, the Somalis improvised an effective air defense system, which shoot down two American helicopters.

United States forces in Somalia relied on one tactic with one type of force.⁸⁸ Although United States forces were aware of the changing insurgent tactic and techniques they continued to follow the template that had previously proved successful, confident that their professionalism could overcome any disadvantage.⁸⁹ The Somali clans adapted to the American tactics.

Likewise the Haiti military junta demonstrated their ability adapt their operations to attack the American public opinion. The Governor's Island Accords of 1993 between the United States and Haiti created JTF HAG, an ad hoc organization to reform and retrain the police. The Haitian military junta never intended to implement the Governor's Island Accords and devised a method to defeat the Governor's Island Accords without direct military confrontation.

The events in Mogadishu presented the Haitian junta with an unorthodox solution to the prospect of American intervention. They had observed the harsh debates the military casualties in Somalia triggered in the United States Congress. They decide to stage anti-American demonstrations to convince the American people that any mission to Haiti would suffer casualties similar to the fighting recently experienced in Mogadishu. The USS Harlan County arrived at the harbor of Port-au-Prince on 11 October, 1993 carrying the troops of JTF HAG. The FAd'H implemented their plan and the global media broadcast the pictures of drunken Haitian demonstrators chanting 'Remember Somalia' and attacking the United States Embassy vehicle present at the port.⁹⁰ The result of the news coverage was the unplanned withdrawal and dissolution of the JTF HAG. This was a direct result of the junta's effective information operations.⁹¹ In both Somalia and Haiti, threat forces were able to adapt to American actions to formulate solutions to resist intervention efforts.

Sub-state actors will use unorthodox and nontraditional responses to counter military attempts to restore order. Tribal groups may lack professional discipline and formal institutions for command to exert control over the actions of their group members. This can lead to asymmetrical attacks such as committing atrocities. Contrary to western conventions, Somali mobs pulled the mutilated bodies of killed American troops through city streets, which was broadcast through the news media.⁹²

Where group leadership does exist, it can engage in deliberate acts of subterfuge, deception and duplicity. These acts might include signing agreements with no intention of honoring the terms of agreement or deceptively involving American forces in local conflicts. United States military forces operating in Haiti discovered local people would frequently submit a false report on a rival clan member in order to trigger a military action towards that group.⁹³

Many of these tactics may be used with the direct intention of conducting elementary information operations. Satellite communications allow the news media to broadcast isolated

incidents at remote military checkpoints to a global audience. Sub-state actors are increasingly aware of this capability and will attempt to create media events to shift the public opinion in the United States. Threat forces can also use their internal channels of communications to create resistance to the United States' policies and objectives. Once the United States' forces became entangled in an armed conflict with Aidid in Somalia, he effectively used his status as 'public enemy number one' to rally competing Somalia tribes. He effectively portrayed his 'David and Goliath' struggle against the United States as a struggle of all Moslems against the American infidels.⁹⁴

These comparisons of the battle command visualizations and the failed state model produce a number of initial conclusions on the effectiveness of LIC doctrine: the mental model for conducting operations is inadequate to describe the failed state, the TTP's stability support operations are satisfactory, and finally, doctrine is adaptive to diverse situation. It fails, however, to emphasize the adaptability of threat forces to United States military forces actions.

Before any final conclusions are reached, why these inconsistencies occurred should be understood. Why did the direct relationships envisioned from FM 7-98 fail to materialize? The United States' experience in Somalia indicates the problem is the result of flaws in LIC doctrine's mental model. Military operations in a failed state are extremely complex. Major General S.L. Arnold cited the "complexity" as the primary lesson learned from his mission to Somalia. He warned future military leaders to, "Be prepared for crash courses on the country, the people, and the political, economic and military situation."⁹⁵

Multiple interactive variables within a failed state prevent direct relations visualized in LIC doctrine from forming. There are a number of areas where multiple agents exist in a LIC environment. First, failed states contain multiple competing sub-state factions, instead of a homogenous insurgency operating against the government. Second, non-political forces, such as the ecology or ethnicity, are as important as organized sub-state actors. Third, multiple friendly

power sources exist instead of a single host nation government. Finally, military forces operating in a failed state environment will perform multiple missions simultaneously.

The first inconsistency concerns the organization of threat forces. Military forces operating in a failed state will interact with multiple, competing threats rather than a single insurgent movement. Political and military power inside a failed state is dispersed among ethnic groups, tribal warlords and local strongmen. These sub-state actors tenuously control some territory and may have different degrees of support from the people they claim to represent.⁹⁶ These sub-state actors are continuously interacting based on their self-interests and perceived threats to produce new sets of conditions and relationships.

The environment inside Somalia fits this complex social model. Fifteen competing Somali clan based factions were fighting among themselves when United Nations forces deployed to Somalia.⁹⁷ Each of these tribal groups had competing goals and interests. The introduction of military forces into this environment simply added another competing group into the local balance of power. Clans realigned their interest based on the actions of the United Nations forces and the reaction of their tribal rivals to the intervention. Military forces could not predict what affect their actions would create, without a firm grasp of the intricate relations between the factions.⁹⁸

A second inconsistency between mental models is the number of friendly actors working in the environment. Military forces operating in failed states must cooperate with multiple sets of friendly forces instead of a single host nation government. The United States will most likely deploy to a failed state as a part of a multinational relief effort. This will drastically affect a military commander's ability to conduct tactical operations.

The chain of command is more complicated in a multinational environment. Military forces operating in a coalition or United Nations mission must respond to the local commander as well as the chain of command of their national government. The chances of orders being misunderstood, ignored or contested logarithmically increases as each new force added to the chain of command.⁹⁹

As a result, a tactical commander operating in a failed state environment can find allied forces pursuing different policies, which may undermine the effectiveness of the overall operation. Allied forces in Somalia found profound differences in their interpretation of the rules of engagement, and military policies, which prevented unified action between the forces.¹⁰⁰

The separate national chains of command of coalition forces adds additional political dimensions to any military intervention. Some national forces cannot participate in high-risk operations without the explicit approval from their national command authority. It is reasonable to expect that some coalition partners will have political or economic interests in the area of operation, which can create hidden agendas, and ulterior motives, which will further complicate military operations.¹⁰¹

Non Governmental Organizations, (NGO's), are another friendly source of power. Like multinational military forces, NGO's create additional variables in a failed state scenario. There were seventy-eight different NGO's involved with relief efforts in Somalia.¹⁰² During UNITAF operations, formal and informal cooperation between United States military forces and NGO's and United Nations agencies was remarkably good but frequently strained. Points of contention included differences in organizational policy. Several NGO's decided to employ armed Somali factions to secure their activities and facilities despite the fact that United States military forces were attempting to disarm the same Somali clans. This disagreement is illustrative of the cultural difference between relief organizations and the military forces. The humanitarian workers were willing to use any means available to stop the immediate causes of human suffering. However military forces were directed to effect the long-term social changes within the failed state. Frequently, these different goals can clash and create additional friction between allied operations.¹⁰³

The FM 7-98 mental model also does not consider the influence of multiple non-political variables. The enemy forces are not limited to organized human activities. If the enemy is defined

as elements which cause instability, possible threat agents can also include environmental factors as well as political groups. One of the principle causes of state failure in Somalia was the combined environmental and economic problems, which undermined the livestock export market. In this case, drought and foreign competition in the livestock markets were also causing instability. A brigade commander from the 10th Mountain Division deployed to Haiti observed, "It took a considerable conceptual shift for the S-2 to go from defining the threat as a line wire diagram of the former military, and we redefined the threat to be any group, individual, organization or condition that would impede the accomplishment of our mission."¹⁰⁴

Finally, the requirement for military forces to perform multiple, simultaneous operations is a variable not clearly defined in existing doctrine. One dimension of the complexity is the number and type of missions an intervening force is assigned. The United States Marine Corps conducted a study of their participation in LIC operations spanning the period from 1897 to 1993. Their findings noted that recent operations required Marine units to conduct several different types of operations at the same time. In Somalia, Marines executed humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, nation building, police functions and population movements all at the same time.¹⁰⁵

A general systems model is an effective mental model for representing tactical operations in a failed state. Systems science is a relatively new school of thought based on the idea that complex problems are best understood through the study of the interrelationship between the problem's variables. Classical science divided the world into specialized disciplines of thought. Its premise was if all of the detailed components of a system were thoroughly understood the system's operation would become obvious. However, in many complex situations this intellectual approach is unsatisfactory.¹⁰⁶

In complex systems, such as the ecology, detailed study of a single variable will not produce solutions. If an animal species population drops to the point where the animal is endangered the

classical approach to science would require a detailed study of the animal. Despite the intense focus of thousands of researchers on the animal's health and breeding habits, and an intensive-breeding program fails and the species becomes extinct.

A systems approach would direct researchers to study the animal, his environment, and all of the variables which might influence the animal. Researchers studying all the environmental variables would discover agricultural pesticides in a neighboring state are captured in rain water run off, carried down stream into the animals' habitat and contaminate the food chain two levels below the endangered species. Systems science focus on relationships allows researchers to discover problems, which are not obvious through specialized study.¹⁰⁷

Systems science is an effective model for military operations. It fits battle command doctrine require to understand the environment. LTG John E. Miller, the deputy director of TRADOC and one of the principle authors of battle command doctrine, defined visualization as, "... the ability to see the relationships between enemy forces, friendly forces, the environment and the desired end state in time, space and purpose."¹⁰⁸ The application of systems theory to problems arising in business, government, and international politics demonstrates that the approach works. It leads to improved understanding of complex problems and improved predictive capability.¹⁰⁹ Thinking of the enemy in terms of a system provides military forces the opportunity of achieving their assigned objectives with minimal effort and the maximum chance of success.¹¹⁰

A general systems interpretation of the Haitian environment allowed military forces to design an effective course of action during Operation Uphold Democracy, the United States' intervention into Haiti. It allowed commanders to see the operation occur in their mind and select courses of action to achieve the End State.

Major General Meade, the Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force in Haiti, described how he rationalized his mission in Haiti. The CJTF's mission included: protecting United States citizens, establishing a safe and secure environment, and facilitating the return of a functional

government. He believed 'stability' was an ambiguous term for a military planner, but it makes sense when it is taken in context of describing a complex system. According to Major General Meade, "What came out, pretty quickly, was that the task of establishing a safe and secure, or stable and secure environment, was the one (task) that enabled all of the others." Port-au-Prince was designated as the center of gravity for the operation. "It's only in Port-au-Prince that all of the various military, economic, and political pieces are plugged up into a national level grid where they have national importance."¹¹¹

A systems approach also allowed the CJTF to select an effective courses of action to defeat the FAd'H threat. The FAd'H was the source of political repression, serious human rights abuses, and a direct threat to the United States through its links to narcotics smuggling. However, the FAd'H was the only state institution still functioning within Haiti. Its dissolution or destruction would have required United States forces to assume the FAd'H's domestic security responsibilities. United States forces were not prepared to assume this mission for a variety of reasons including an acute shortage of Creole linguists. As a result of the military's understanding of these interrelated variables United States forces were directed to supervise the FAd'H operations rather than disband the force. This decision allowed military forces to limit the adverse effects of the FAd'H until an effective long-term replacement police force was trained.¹¹² The threat was removed without endangering the mission's accomplishment.

The analysis of the comparison between the visualizations of FM 7-98 and the common conditions of a failed state indicate there are several important inadequacies. Doctrine does not present an adequate visualization of the threat, the environment or the nature of the conflict. As a result, commanders cannot use doctrine to assist their visualization of the battlefield or mentally develop the sequence of actions necessary to reach their end state.

V Conclusion

This monograph provides a number of conclusions on the utility of LIC tactical doctrine. First, the tactical doctrine outlined in FM 7-98 is not an effective tool for exercising battle command in a failed state. A commander with extensive experience in conventional operations but little or no experience in peace operations could not effectively use FM 7-98 to compliment his intuition to visualize tactical operations.

The primary problem with LIC doctrine is its inaccurate mental model. It does not create an accurate vision of the failed state environment. The direct relationships which may have been present in a traditional counterinsurgency against a Maoist based people's army are not present in a failed state. It creates an inaccurate mental picture of the enemy. As a result, the commander cannot mentally 'see' the enemy he is fighting. LIC doctrine retains a cold war mentality of templating an enemy and applying military power to defeat the target, which may not always be possible or appropriate to operations in a failed state.

It is debatable whether a Maoist model of insurgency has any utility on such a broad scale. The flaw with the Maoist model presented in FM 7-98 is that it incorrectly assumes that the Communist Chinese model of insurgency is widely transferable. Mao Tse-Tung developed his insurgency based on the conditions he faced in China in 1940. Mao considered the strategic lines of communication to Japan, the long-term prospect for United States assistance and support to the Chinese forces and many other unique variables to develop his strategy.¹¹³ Mao's insurgency model was designed to fight and win two different conflicts simultaneously. He was fighting to win the political allegiance of the people of China while attempting to defeat the military forces of Japan.

The revolutionary nature of a Maoist insurgency is inconsistent with the characteristics of the threats found in a failed state. A Maoist based people's war is focusing on attaining widespread popular support for the insurgent's political objective. Revolutionary leaders need to convince the

population that the new government can better meet the needs of the county than the current administration. Criminal organizations and ethnic groups in a failed state do not share these goals. It is unlikely that these groups will be willing to grant any degree of control to a political or military body outside of their primary group.¹¹⁴

A Maoist model translates poorly to other areas. The Vietnamese recognized the unique nature of the Maoist model and modified it during the Vietnam War into a different concept called Dau Tranh, which was conceptually different through the elimination of the division between the insurgent and the population.¹¹⁵ If the Maoist model is not transferable to other cultures and situations, it has questionable utility to commanders attempting to understand the equally challenging environment of a failed state. Sub-state actors do not necessarily require wide spread popular support to retain the military power.

Doctrine writers should search for a model which can effectively illustrate the wide range of potential threats inherent in a failed state. Historical research is one possible resource. Although failed states seem to be a new problem to contemporary military planners, the United States has extensive experience with these types of operations before communist insurrections became our primary cold war focus. The first United States intervention into Haiti is an example of one possible resource.

The United States intervened in Haiti in 1915 after the murder of President Guillaume Same. The United States Marines occupied Haiti for fifteen years. The marines completed a number of public works projects, which significantly added to the nation's infrastructure, and maintained order while fighting a sporadic insurgency against bands of "Cacos" mercenaries. The overall operation was a mixed success, but it does offer an example of intervention into a failed state, which pre-dates our experience operating against communist revolutions.¹¹⁶

A second possible resource is the *Small Wars Manual*. Between 1890's to 1934 the United States Marine Corps occupied a number of other troubled countries including the Philippines,

Cuba, Puerto Rico, Honduras, Mexico, Guam, Samoa, China and Nicaragua. The small, tightly knit cadre of Marine officers learned a great deal from these operations and compiled them into the *Small Wars Manual* published in 1940.¹¹⁷

The manual contains a wealth of tactical information. It offers an insurgency model in which the actions of the United States forces define the phases of insurgency. It offers TTP's for supervising elections, lists the tactical considerations for conducting combat operations under diverse situations, and provides guides for developing staff estimates on terrain, geography, the population and the threat. All of these TTP's are free from preconceptions concerning a communist insurgency. While the manual is not based on specific operations in a failed state, it does offer the experiences of a broad spectrum of operations, from the Philippines to Haiti, that deal with a variety of insurgencies and some forms of tribal combat.

Tribal conflicts, similar to the intervention in Somalia, are also not a new phenomena. In 1896, a captain in the British army named Charles Callwell wrote *Small Wars-Their Principles and Practice*. It reflected his experience from the second Afghan War, operations in India in 1881, and his experience in the final operations directed against the Transvaal Boers in South Africa. Callwell had extensive experience with operations against savage and semi-civilized warrior cultures. He observed, "In these small wars the enemy does not offer an intricate organization as an object for the commander of the regular troops to direct his energies against."¹¹⁸ CPT Callwell's experiences seem to more closely resemble the United States experiences in Somalia and Haiti than the communist insurgency in Vietnam. The United States Army should examine experienced, fighting, warrior cultures on the American frontier, the Philippine Islands and Mexico to develop a greater understanding of conflict with tribal cultures. Doctrine writers should consider these resources as well as the growing body of post cold war interventions into failed states to improve the army's tactical doctrine for operating in this challenging military environment.

Historical study should be linked to the general systems theory of scientific thought. The linear model used in developing FM 7-98 has limited utility in explaining the failed state environment. FM 7-98 recognizes the ambiguity of LIC scenarios and emphasizes the need for decentralized command and control through the commander's intent to free the initiative for subordinates.¹¹⁹ This is a vital component of LIC operations but it neglects the equally important feed back loop from top to bottom and from the bottom to the top.

Adopting a general systems model for failed state environments will facilitate the development of improved command and control systems in failed state operations. Complex systems are fundamentally uncertain. There are simply too many variables interacting in a system to accurately predict what consequence an action will have. Operations in a complex environment must focus on finding the macroscopic methods of command and control. A responsive, adaptive system of command and control is required to react to the uncertain, adaptive conditions. LIC operations will require an equal degree of subordinate leaders initiative and centralized control to guide the initiative of subordinates if it is to achieve macroscopic control to implement the strategic End State. Rules of engagement and force protection measures are two examples of aspects of military control which can be centralized to varying degrees to support operational objectives.¹²⁰

Everything contained in the existing tactical doctrine is not wrong. This monograph reaffirms the relationship between the threat of military force and the reduction in threat activity. This supports the principle that overwhelming combat power is an effective means of implementing a degree of stability through non-violent occupation of terrain. The principle of overmatching the opponent works in a failed state.

There is one last area where this study can make a contribution to the development of peace operations doctrine. There is a long-standing debate among military leaders on the best method for providing military forces for peace operations. Some have advocated the unique nature of peace operations mandates that certain military units should be exclusively trained and organized for

peace operations. Others have argued that peace operations are a special mission that can be assigned to conventional combat forces with limited peace operations training prior to deploying into the area of operation.¹²¹

This evaluation suggests that both schools of thought are partially correct. The TTP's outlined in our current tactical doctrine are adequate for tactical operations in a failed state. These TTP's closely resemble conventional combat tasks of any infantry or armored unit. There is no major training requirement for conventional combat units to learn new military skills before deploying to conduct peace operations in a failed state.

However, a unique training requirement does exist for leaders. MG Arnold was previously cited that companies and squads performed the same TTP's for failed state operations that they had previously trained for to prepare for conventional combat. He also observed a training shortfall at the battalion level and above where commanders and staffs were stretched beyond their experience. Tactical leaders required additional training in peace operations in these new environments.¹²² The critical component in developing these leadership competencies is an effective doctrine, which will allow them to exercise effective battle command. If doctrine does not provide the leadership with the tools to 'see the enemy' and understand how it operates in the tactical environment, commanders and staffs will continue to struggle in the unfamiliar failed state environment.

The need for United States military forces to intercede in the demanding conditions of failed states will remain part of our national security strategy for the foreseeable future. The Army's success in future deployments will be greatly influenced by the degree to which the leaders and planners recognize the unique demands of operating in the failed state and are able to adapt to the new tactical battlefield. The evaluation of LIC doctrine contained in FM 7-98 is part of a required debate on developing the best doctrine to accomplish these difficult missions.

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